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Competitive agents extract in continuous time from a commons. Capital
market access allows them to both save and borrow against their extraction
stream. When the commons asset grows more quickly than the privately
stored one, multiple equilibria are found for intermediate commons endow-
ments. One of these has the extinction date and welfare decrease in the
endowment, a resource curse. When the commons asset grows less quickly
than the privately stored one, there is a unique extinction date for each en-
dowment level. In the limit, as marginal extraction costs become constant,
`jump extinctions' occur. In cases with multiple equilibria: welfare is in-
creased for low initial stock levels when agents do not have access to capital
markets, but decreased otherwise; and an extraction tax reduces welfare in
the `cursed' equilibrium, increases it in the other ¯nite extinction equilibrium
and expands the set of commons stocks that are never extinguished.
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equilibrium, extinction, resource curse, multiple equilibrium
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In almost any contemporary common access problem, those drawing on the
resource also have access to capital markets. Thus, the proceeds of their
extraction need not be immediately consumed; they may be saved, or even
borrowed against. In spite of this, relatively little attention has been paid
to the e®ects of capital market access on commons problems. This paper
and a companion (Dutta and Rowat, 2003) seek to redress this. A particular
interest of the present paper is e®ect of access to capital markets on the
`extinction' of the commons.
The simplest commons analyses, dating to Gordon (1954), are static:
free entry allows the rents associated with a natural resource to be competed
away - the `tragedy of the commons'. The free entry assumption motivates
competitive rather than strategic solution concepts. The static framework
obviates questions of capital market access.
This is, however, a large dynamic commons literature which concerns
itself with intertemporal issues. To date, the bulk of this has not allowed
capital market access, forcing each agent into intertemporal autarky. See
Mirman (1979); Levhari and Mirman (1980); Benhabib and Radner (1992);
Dutta and Sundaram (1993); Dockner and Sorger (1996); Sorger (1998) for
examples of this literature.1 Thus, subject to Inada conditions, it is never
in anybody's interest to ransack to the point of extinction. Of course, the
commons are often over¯shed or overgrazed relative to what a benevolent
planner would ordain.2
More recently, the possibility of relating consumption and extraction
through a intertemporal constraint, rather than constraints in each period,
has been explored. As we outline, this has been done in a number of ways,
from simple storage technologies to access to capital markets. The present
paper focusses on this latter possibility. We argue that the possibility of
private storage can remove Inada's prohibition, thereby allowing extinction,
and possibly even greater ine±ciency.
One of the earliest examples of this literature is Sinn (1984). In this,
1Houba, Sneek, and V¶ ardy (2000) present an interesting twist on this literature in their
alternating o®ers model played concurrently with a ¯shing game to determine the size of
the pie.
2Exceptions to this result exist. Dutta and Sundaram (1993) present a discrete time
example in which under-exploitation of the commons can occur when trigger strategies
are de¯ned on the state variable; they note that this idea is also found in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983). Their equilibria remain ine±cient. In continuous time, Benhabib
and Radner (1992) ¯nd ranges of initial conditions that allow trigger strategies yielding
e±cient equilibria. Dockner and Sorger (1996) and Sorger (1998) also derive conditions
under which equilibria are e±cient.
1oligopolistic ¯rms extract oil from underground reserves, either to sell im-
mediately or store above ground. As ¯rms own private oil ¯elds, which only
interact through seepage, is a problem of oligopolistic competition in the
product market rather than extraction from a commons.
Kremer and Morcom (2000) consider a model with genuine storage. Com-
petitive poachers may kill elephants (an open access resource) and store their
ivory tusks at the opportunity cost. In contrast to the preceding literature
that they cite, they argue that there may be
multiple equilibria for open-access renewable resources used in
the production of storable goods, because if others poach, the
animal will become scarce, and this will increase the price of the
good, making poaching more attractive.
In our model, there is an interval of initial commons stock levels within which
multiple equilibria are found. In particular, there are three, two involving
extinction in ¯nite time; extinction does not occur in the remaining one.
Homans and Wilen (2001) also explore competitive equilibria. A ¯xed
cost of ¯shing restricts the number of agents to be ¯nite. Further, access to
the commons is regulated, a framework that they regard as more consistent
with existing ¯sheries than open-access. Their attention is focussed on the
market for caught ¯sh: ¯sh caught during the ¯shing season must satisfy a
year's consumer demand; that sold immediately is sold as fresh, and therefore
at a higher price than that sold after being frozen. They argue that increased
rents in the ¯shing industry both induce entry and shorten the ¯shing season,
thus causing more ¯sh to be sold on the inferior market.3
The most recent paper in this literature is Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant
(2002), which also considers competitive equilibria in a commons environ-
ment with private storage.4 Its motivating examples are powerful: very rapid
depletion of underground oil reserves, annual ¯shing quotas and groundwa-
ter. As average extraction costs become constant, their model captures these
`jump extinctions', which are similar to speculative attacks. We also obtain
this result as a limit case of our model: generically, the road to extinction is
smooth in our model.
Two earlier, related papers address considered the possibility not of costly
storage, but of full access to capital markets: yield-bearing storage and costly
borrowing. Tornell and Velasco (1992) ask why capital °ows from poor coun-
tries to rich countries. They interpret poor countries as having not just high
3Fish raised in farms are often fed ¯sh pellets (Weiss, 2002). Such farms may therefore
be a way of converting cheaper (frozen) ¯sh into more expensive fresh ¯sh.
4Their suggestion that the earlier literature neglects storage uses an unfortunate ex-
ample given that cows are ruminants.
2rates of return, but weak property rights so that domestic returns can be
appropriated by anyone with equal facility; thus, domestic investment is in-
vestment in a commons. Capital °ight corresponds to private storage of
pillage from common property in a wealthy country, thus at lower rates of
return. With perfect international capital markets, borrowing and lending
may occur at the same rate.
As there is a small number of interest groups, their solution concept is a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
A sequel, Tornell and Lane (1999), again imagines a country with weak
institutions. Now, the interest groups compete for control over government
revenues, raised by taxing the formal sector. Thus, the formal (high return)
sector becomes a commons; the informal (low return) sector is the medium
for private storage.
These papers suggest a very di®erent interpretation of the commons prob-
lem than the standard one, in which the tragedy is that of the rents' dissipa-
tion. In their view, the commons is associated with poorly de¯ned property
rights, weak institutions, and poverty.5 From this point of view, the tragedy
of these commons may be their persistence, not their extinction. By con-
trast, richer countries have likely enclosed their commons at some point in
the past.
Thus, to the extent that extinction corresponds to enhanced property
rights, it may be a desirable outcome. The standard interpretation of the
tragedy reminds us, though, that this is not assured: the costs of enforcing
property rights may dissipate rents.6
Equilibrium extinction may therefore be seen as voluntary privatization:
a self-enforcing move from common to private property. Enclosures, gold
rushes or, for that matter, the acquisition of Mesopotamian antiquities by
private collections are all pertinent examples: are such equilibrium alloca-
tions of property rights likely to lead to e±ciency?7 If so, might this provide
a mechanism for a `resource curse', whereby societies better endowed with
resources may take longer to move to private property? (See Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) for a review of this literature.)
A weakness of Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999) in
this context is that their models rule out the possibility of full extinction or
enclosure. As extraction is costless in their model, an extreme version of the
limit case of Gaudet et al. (2002), one might expect this to occur instantly.
5In the popular debate, this view has been argued forcefully by de Soto (2000).
6A Washington lawyer advising on investment in Iraq \believes security costs could in
some cases total 25% of a contract's value" (Richter, 2003).
7In a twist on the usual story, dogs, which allowed themselves to be enclosed by us, are
abundant while wolves, which did not, are not.
3Even more counter-intuitively, Tornell and Velasco (1992) claim that the
possibility of foreign storage of pillage
puts a °oor on the common-access asset's rate of return and, thus,
a ceiling on the appropriation rate. If this constraint is binding,
interest groups will be forced to reduce their appropriation rate.
This will increase aggregate capital accumulation, ameliorate the
tragedy of the commons, and increase welfare.
To explore these questions further, this paper looks at perhaps the sim-
plest possible representation of the problem, close to the industry standard
on tragedy of the commons, but with capital market access. A model is pre-
sented in Section 2. This closely follows the structure of the models presented
in Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999), generalising in
two ways. First, extraction may be costly. Second, strategies are not required
to be shares of existing stocks. Without this latter generalisation, extinction
is not technically possible.
While our model is consistent with the interpretations given to high and
low rates of return in both Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane
(1999), it is also consistent with a third variant: there is only one rate of
return, but the costs of enclosing resources to protect them against expropri-
ation reduce the net rate of return on privately held resources to the lower
rate. Thus, the di®erence between the high and low rates may be seen as re-
°ecting the weakness of property rights. This interpretation is very general,
encompassing situations of both economic and biological growth.
The examples motivating Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and
Lane (1999) have an illicit °avour to them. While the ability to bank one's
`plunder' seems relatively uncontentious, the possibility of borrowing against
future plunder does seem less plausible. The empirical support for this prac-
tice does seem specialised: Ross (2003, pp. 32-) discusses `booty futures' in
the context of civil wars.
This illicit °avour is unnecessary: a re¯nery may borrow against its ex-
pected pro¯ts, calculated on the assumption that it will be able to discharge
combustion byproducts into the communal atmosphere.
Following Gaudet et al. (2002), Kremer and Morcom (2000) and Homans
and Wilen (2001), the solution concept is a rational expectations equilibrium:
there are no barriers to entry; individuals are small and do not take account
of the impact of their actions on the evolution of aggregate capital stock.
This is introduced in Section 3. (In the companion paper, Dutta and Rowat
(2003), we evaluate the extent to which strategic, subgame perfect equilibria
inherit these extinction properties. We ¯nd that they do, even for very small
numbers of agents.)
4As noted, we ¯nd the Gaudet et al. (2002) `jump extinction' as a special
case. More generally, low initial commons stocks correspond to unique solu-
tions, with extinction in ¯nite time; an intermediate range of initial commons
stock produces the multiple equilibria already mentioned; initial stocks above
this level are never exhausted.
Section 4 compares competitive outcomes with capital market access to
autarkic ones in which competitive agents do not have access to capital mar-
kets. In the example analysed, welfare under autarky is higher for low initial
stock levels. Once commons stocks are su±cient to support multiple extinc-
tion dates, superior welfare can be obtained with capital market access.
Section 5 considers the consequences of an extraction tax; it has the
e®ect of shrinking the interval of commons stock levels that lead to multiple
extinction dates. This shrinks the domain over which the `cursed' equilibrium
can arise and expands the set of commons stocks that are never extinguished.




Time, indexed by t; passes continuously toward an in¯nite horizon. At every
point in time, a continuum of individuals, indexed by i and distributed on
the unit interval with cumulative distribution F; decides on extraction, xi =
fxi(t)g; and consumption, ci = fci(t)g:
There is a single consumption good, whose stock, k = fk(t)g; is common
property. It grows at rate a. At each point in time, individuals extract,
in total, x(t) =
R
i xi(t)dF(i) from the commons, storing it as their private
property.8 Thus, xi (t) is the (¯nite) extraction rate at time t of in¯nitesimal
agents dF (i).
The extraction path, x = fx(t)g, de¯nes the initial value problem
_ k (t) = ak (t) ¡ x(t);k(0) > 0 (1)
whose solution is the path of the capital stock whenever k(t) > 0.
An extinction date is the earliest T ¸ 0; such that k(T) = 0: If limt!1 k(t)
> 0; then T = 1; which corresponds to non-extinction. Since k(T) = 0 )
x(T) = 0; the capital stock is absorbed at 0 and










8This general speci¯cation is not generally taken advantage of. We often replace dF (i)
with the uniform di.
5Equation 2 describes the unique solution to initial value problem whenever
x(t) is continuous over [0;T) (Walter, 1998, p.28). Thus, aggregate extrac-
tion is admissible if x(t) is continuous over [0;T).9
It may be seen immediately that restricting extraction rates to be shares
of the commons stock, as in Tornell and Velasco (1992), precludes extinction.
Let xi (t) = ¾ik (t) and x(t) = ¾k (t). Then the solution to equation of
motion 1 is





Thus, the capital stock either grows to in¯nity or asymptotes to zero. This
argument applies regardless of whether the ¾i are derived competitively or
strategically.
Goods extracted from the commons are presented to capital markets.
If saved, they earn a return of r · a. Equally, future extraction may be
borrowed against, smoothing consumption, at the same rate.
Capital market access enables a decomposition of individuals' optimiza-
tion problems: instantaneous feasibility constraints on consumption are re-




¡rt (ci (t) ¡ xi (t))dt · 0: (3)
Thus, xi(t) < ci(t) implies borrowing against future extraction. The possi-
bility of default is not considered.
It may happen, for r high enough, that individuals' chosen paths satisfy
xi(t) > ci(t) up to some T. We do not impose this as a constraint on
individuals.
Individuals choose extraction and consumption paths to maximize utility
subject to their budget constraint, 3, and to a feasibility (or non-negativity)
constraint

















; ® ¸ 0 and C (x) =
x1+°
1 + °
; ° ¸ 0:
9Dockner, J¿rgenson, Long, and Sorger (2000, p. 40, De¯nition 3.1) use `feasible' in
place of `admissible'.
6Utility from consumption is concave while extraction costs are convex: U
00 ·
0;C
00 ¸ 0: Values of ® > 1 yield utility function more concave than the log,
which corresponds to ® = 1:
It may seem natural to set ° = 0, linear extraction costs. This may
be interpreted as a situation in which there is a competitive market for the
inputs into a CRS extraction function. As we shall see, aggregate extraction
grows exponentially over time. Thus, insofar as this interpretation implies a
labour market, the wages of a ¯xed supply of labourers may be bid up. This
is consistent with ° > 0.
It will be seen that ° = 0 produces bang-bang style solutions. Thus, we
treat this case separately from the generic case, in which we assume ° > 0.
Similarly, although techniques can be developed to handle ® = 0, we work
with ® > 0.
To ensure ¯nite valuations, we impose Uzawa-integrability conditions:
(1 ¡ ®)r < ½ < (1 + °)r: (U)
The origins of these will become clearer later.
Individuals di®er in their costs of extraction or access to common prop-
erty. Thus, µi > µj implies i has easier access. Alternatively, individuals may
also be regarded as being indexed by µi > 0:
A rational expectations equilibrium is described by sequences fk ¸ 0;ci ¸ 0;xi ¸ 0g
and an extinction time, T; such that k(t) = 0 for all t ¸ T; where
1. individuals choose consumption and extraction paths to maximize util-
ities subject to their budget and feasibility constraints;
2. the evolution of the capital stock is determined by the aggregate ex-
traction path.
The equilibrium is competitive in the standard sense: although individu-
als' aggregate behaviour in°uences the economic environment, T in this case,
they disregard their individual e®ects on it. Thus, our agents are extinction
date takers.
In the following, we solve the model for equilibrium, and, in particular,
for extinction dates.
3 Rational equilibria
The assumption that individuals can borrow and lend at rate r allows the
decomposition of their problem of determining extraction and consumption
into two separate problems:
71. the consumption-smoothing problem: choose ci(t) given total wealth
Xi(r) =
R 1
0 e¡rtxi(t)dt subject to constraint 3; and
2. the e®ort-smoothing problem: choose xi(t); given the extinction date
T and feasibility constraint, 4.
3.1 The consumption smoothing problem

























¡rtci (t)dt ¡ Xi(r)
¸
:
The ensuing Euler equation is standard:
ci (t) =





This is independent of a;° and µi. Its constant term is determined by the
constraint. Substitution into the objective function of equation 6 therefore
produces the maximized present value of utility from consumption















The Uzawa ¯nite valuation condition for consumption is ½ > r(1 ¡ ®):
This is trivially satis¯ed if ® ¸ 1 (U (c) is more concave than log(c)). We
note that







is the growth rate of consumption and ci(0) is chosen to satisfy (3):
ci(0) = (r ¡ gc)Xi(r): (9)
The Uzawa condition may therefore be expressed as gc < r: consumption
growth is lower than the interest rate.
83.2 The e®ort smoothing problem















¡½tC (xi (t))dt; (10)
subject to feasibility constraint 4.
When t < T, the ensuing Euler equation yields



















° and · is a positive constant. Evaluating this at t = 0 produces
xi (0) = · so that
xi (t) =
½
xi(0)egt for t < T
0 for t ¸ T
¾
: (11)






0 exp(¡(r ¡ g)t)dt)®º: (12)
Thus, extraction is smooth until the extinction date, T: More signi¯cantly,
the problem of choosing an extraction path is reduced to a choice of xi(0).
Note also that the extraction plan is a function of ®: thus, full Fisher sep-
aration of extraction (production) and consumptions plans does not occur.
This is a consequence of ° > 0: extraction costs are borne as non-transferable
disutility.
The Uzawa condition for extraction is now g < r. For now, we assume
that a > r as these situations might be expected to produce the most inter-
esting economic behaviour. (When a · r maintaining the commons o®ers
no bene¯ts.) Thus, for expositional purposes, we concentrate on a > g at
present. Theorem 2 treats the complementary cases as well.
Notice that g = ¡®
°gc; thus, for r > ½; individuals extract early but
consume late. The r = ½ case yields g = gc = 0: This is a potentially
important special case (and `interest rate equals subjective rate of discount'
is well justi¯ed along equilibrium growth paths).
9Notice also that an expression for extraction as a function of capital stock
may now be written. By equations 2 and 11,






















for n 6= 0 and T ¸ 0.11 Notice that Qn (T) increases with T and decreases









Integrating over agents then produces the ¯rst fundamental equation:














i dF (i). This equation gives us a map A : T ! x(0),
monotone decreasing.
We know that x(0) determines the entire path of extractions. We now
obtain the second fundamental equation: the impact of extraction
on the possible extinction date of common property. As extinction occurs at







Thus, by equation 11 and integration over agents,





10In Tornell and Velasco (1992), extraction is assumed to be a linear function of capital
stock; their equilibrium concept is di®erent than that here.
11When n = 0;Qn (T) = T.






















This equation gives us a map I : x(0) ! T; also monotone non-increasing.
Here a low level of initial x(0) guarantees the perpetuation of common prop-
erty but a level higher than (a ¡ g)k(0) results in extinction in ¯nite time.
The discussion above tells us the likely source of multiple equilibrium
in extinction times. Both maps are decreasing: individuals choose to ex-
tract more if they believe that the commons will disappear soon; and higher
extraction rates speed up extinction.







and Ã¤ ´ limt!1 ª(t);Ã¤ ´ maxt ª(t).
Theorem 1. There exist 0 < kL · kH · 1 such that the following state-
ments are true. Given intervals IL = [0;kL);IM = (kL;kH); and IH =
(kH;1):
1. k(0) 2 IL implies unique equilibrium with ¯nite extinction;
2. k(0) 2 IM implies multiple equilibria, one with non-extinction and two
with ¯nite extinction;
3. k(0) 2 IH implies unique equilibrium without extinction;
4. k(0) = kL = kH implies a unique equilibrium with non-extinction;
5. k(0) = either kL or kH, distinct, implies a unique equilibrium with
extinction, and a unique equilibrium with non-extinction.
The following lemmata are used to prove the theorem:
Lemma 1. limt!0 ª(t) = 0.
11Proof. As Qn(0) = 0; assessing ª(0) requires use of l'H^ opital's rule: dif-












Lemma 2. When the Uzawa extraction condition holds and a > g;0 < Ã¤ <
1.
Proof. By de¯nition, limt!1 Qn(t) = 1








The Uzawa extraction condition ensures that the numerator is strictly posi-
tive. When a > g, the denominator is as well, ensuring the results.
Lemma 3. An equilibrium with ¯nite extinction time T satis¯es ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ .
Proof. Equations A and I, with Qa¡g (T) =
k(0)
x(0), are satis¯ed in equilibrium.
The result follows by de¯nition 15.





Proof. Assume that Ã¤ ·
k(0)













so that rearrangement produces
k (0)
x(0)




which satis¯es equation I. Thus, the conditions for equilibrium are satis¯ed.
By contrast, if Ã¤ >
k(0)
¹ , the ¯nal inequality above does not satisfy
equation I.
12When n · 0 the limit is in¯nite.
12Lemma 5. For ª(t) to be strictly quasiconcave, either of the following are
su±cient:
1. a 6= g;



























By l'H^ opital's rule, when a = g or r = g, the whole term in which it is
contained is zero. Thus, the stated conditions of the lemma su±ce to ensure
that either the ¯rst or second term of D0 (t) is negative.
If either term is non-zero, the whole expression is strictly negative. This
su±ces for lnª(t) to be strictly concave and, thus, for ª(t) to be strictly
quasiconcave.
Now prove the Theorem:
Proof. When k (0) 2 IL, k (0) ¸ 0 and Ã¤ >
k(0)
¹ . Lemmata 1 and 2 and the
continuity of ª(t) ensure that there is a single ¯nite T such that ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ .
By Lemma 3, this implies a unique equilibrium with ¯nite extinction date.
As the inequality in Ã¤ is the reverse of the necessary and su±cient condition
in Lemma 4, there are no equilibria with in¯nite extinction dates.
Now consider k (0) 2 IM ) Ã¤ <
k(0)
¹ < Ã¤. The ¯rst of these ensures,
by Lemma 4, the existence of an equilibrium with an in¯nite extinction date.
For the second inequality to hold, it must be that Ã¤ < Ã¤. By the continuity
of ª(t) and the de¯nition of Ã¤, there are two ¯nite T such that ª(T) =
k(0)
¹ < Ã¤. By Lemma 3, these are equilibria with ¯nite extinction times.
When k (0) 2 IH;
k(0)
¹ > Ã¤. Thus, by Lemma 3, there are no equilibria
with ¯nite extinction times; by Lemma 4, there is one without extinction.
Now consider the degenerate cases. First, k(0) = kL = kH !
k(0)
¹ =
Ã¤ = Ã¤. By Lemma 3, there is no equilibrium with ¯nite extinction as Ã¤
is only reached as T ! 1. Lemma 4 is satis¯ed with equality, producing an
equilibrium without extinction.
Finally, when kL 6= kH, Lemma 4 is satis¯ed. Now a single ¯nite T
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Two ¯nite T's, one in¯nite
Ã¤
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Figure 1: Extinction dates when ® = ° = 1;a = 0:1;r = 0:03
Figure 1 shows an example. Multiplying the horizontal axis by ¹ allows
ª(t) to be replaced by k (0), easing interpretation.
To this point, it has been assumed that a > r. While this presents
the most interesting class of cases, its complement contains some canonical
cases. Non-renewable resources, for which a = 0 are the most obvious. These
cases may be analysed using the objects already developed; in some cases,
particular terms will be modi¯ed if their arguments are negative instead of
positive.
Theorem 2. When the Uzawa extraction condition holds:
1. IL is always non-empty.
2. IM is non-empty i® a > r.
3. IH is empty when a · g.
Proof. 1. the continuity of ª(t) and ª(0) = 0 ensure the result if Ã¤ > 0.
When a > g, this has already been demonstrated in Lemma 2. When








Thus, the Uzawa extraction condition ensures that Ã¤ = 1. Finally,
when a < g;limt!1 Qa¡g (t) = 1; as limt!1 Qr¡g (t);Ã¤ is again in¯-
nite.
2. Su±cient conditions for the existence of IM are that ª0 (t) = 0 for a
¯nite t and that ª(t) be strictly quasiconcave. Consider all possible
cases.














> 08t > 0:
Thus, r > a = g su±ces for an empty IM.


















Thus, a stationary point sets the square bracketed term to zero. Equiv-
alently, it solves
ert ¡ egt










Thus, » (t) is continuous for all t ¸ 0 and, by l'H^ opital's rule, » (0) =
r¡g
a¡g. As this is greater in absolute value than the right hand side of
equation 20 for all ° > 0, a su±cient condition for an empty IM is that




(r ¡ a)e(a+r)t ¡ (r ¡ g)e(r+g)t + (a ¡ g)e(a+g)t
(eat ¡ egt)
2 : (21)
When r > a > g, this is positive.
15Now consider r > g > a. By Lemma 5, ª(t) is strictly quasicon-






, a positive ¯nite
number. Its numerator, however, tends to in¯nity. This, by strict qua-
siconcavity, precludes a maximum in ¯nite t. Thus, IM is empty under
these conditions.
Now consider a = r > g. In this case, the square bracketed term in
equation 21 is identically zero, so that »0 (t) = 08t. This su±ces, from
above, for an empty IM.
Finally, consider a > r > g, the case considered above. In this case, the
denominator of » (t) grows more quickly than the numerator, so that
» (t) asymptotes to zero as t ! 1.
3. from the ¯rst steps in the proof, Ã¤ = 1 when a · g. With the Uzawa
extraction condition, this su±ces for an in¯nite Ã¤.
The non-extinction equilibrium may be explicitly eliminated by noting
that allowing for a < g replaces equation I with











Thus, the ¯nal inequality in Lemma 4 requires x(0) = 0. Equation A, in
turn, then requires ¹ = 0, a contradiction by de¯nition of ¹ and º.
Now consider the limit case in which ° ! 0. This seems to correspond
to that studied in Gaudet et al. (2002). In this case, extraction costs re°ect
only total extraction, rather than its rate. Thus, pulse extraction is no more
costly than smooth extraction. Thus, \the extraction contest is so ¯erce that
the common is drained in the instant storage is initiated" (Gaudet et al.,
2002).
Theorem 3 (Gaudet et al. (2002) `jump extinction'). The extinction
date, T, goes to zero with °.
The ¯rst condition includes a = r, the costless storage of Gaudet et al.
(2002).
Proof. Assume that T is ¯nite. Then, under the stated conditions, equations










16This may be rearranged and rewritten in terms of primitives for
k (0)
¹
r + a° ¡ ½









































If T remained positive as ° ! 0, then the right hand side of the equation
would converge to unity, a contradiction. Thus, T ! 0 as ° does.
Thus, jump extinctions only require that extraction costs become linear.
Unlike Gaudet et al. (2002), there is no condition on the cost of storage. The
di®erence between these results does not seem re°ect the di®erence between
storage alone and full capital market access: agents are not taking advantage
of their ability to borrow against future income here. Instead, they are
banking and saving it all initially.
4 The commons without capital markets
This section compares the RE equilibria with capital market access to those
without such access.
When individuals do not have access to capital markets, their consump-
tion and e®ort smoothing problems are addressed as a unit. Intertemporal
budget constraint 3 is replaced by ci (t) = xi (t); feasibility constraint 4 re-























i for t < T
0 for t ¸ T
)
: (22)





®+° for t < T
0 for t ¸ T
¾
: (23)
17The tilde distinguishes this solution from that with capital market access.
As agents are unable to intertemporally smooth, they maximise myopically,
extracting at the instantaneously optimal rate without consideration of the
stock consequences. Thus, extraction is also independent of the initial capital
stock.












Again, it is assumed that the Uzawa conditions derived earlier hold: the term
in º may not be real valued otherwise.




®+° . Stocks of k (0) above this level are never depleted. Further, ~ T is
convex in k (0).
Lemma 6. A necessary condition for ~ x(0) > x(0) is
°




½ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)r
¸®
:
There are always values of k (0) such that ~ x(0) < x(0).
Proof. By equations A and 23, ~ x(0) > x(0) requires
[Qr¡g (T)]
® > º:
As the right hand side is constant in k (0), consider the left hand side. Its
derivative in T is positive, so that a necessary condition for the inequality to
hold is that it hold at




The condition follows from the de¯nitions of g and º.
The second part of the lemma follows from noting that
k (0) = 0 ) T = 0 ! Qr¡g (0) = 0 < º;
when the Uzawa consumption condition holds.
Figure 2 displays an example of the e®ect of capital market access on ex-
tinction dates.13 The curve referring to capital market access is that in Figure
13Maple code available from the authors upon request.







Figure 2: Extinction dates varying in k (0) when ® = ° = 1;½ = 0:05;µi =
18i;a = 0:1;r = 0:03
1. Here, low levels of commons stock are preserved for longer by individuals
without access to capital markets. Above k (0) = ¹Ã¤, an intermediate zone
is entered. In this, the extinction date without capital market access lies
between the two ¯nite extinction dates with capital market access. At the
same time, there is an equilibrium with no extinction when individuals have
access to capital markets.
Finally, above a higher level of k (0), the extinction date without capital
market access is greater than both of the ¯nite dates with access. Again,
though, there is a non-extinction equilibrium with capital market access.
Extinction dates are poor proxies for welfare: late extinction dates are
obtained by low extraction rates. Consider a situation in which the commons
19is exhausted one period earlier under capital market access than it is without
it. In this case, one period of returns at rate a are lost, but the privately
stored extraction in that period then grows at rate r. By contrast, in the
situation without capital market access, the extra period of a growth is not
balanced by future r growth. Thus, we now compare welfare directly.
The equilibrium welfare obtained by the in¯nitesimal agents di with ac-
cess to capital markets may be expressed in terms of initial extraction, xi (0)








®+°° ® + °
(1 ¡ ®)(1 + °)
: (25)
As T is not generally a function of k (0), this cannot be expressed as a function
of k (0) directly.
The welfare obtained by individuals di without access to capital markets





































Figure 3 displays the results for the same parameter values as those used
above. The horizontal line extending across the whole domain corresponds
to welfare in the standard autarkic equilibrium. This this has a nice inter-
pretation - all rents are dissipated regardless of initial commons stock - it
here re°ects ® = 1 and µi = 1.
The rising curve, becoming a horizontal line, represents welfare with ac-
cess to capital markets. The section of the curve that decreases in k (0)
may be thought of as a resource curse segment: here, the e®ect is driven by
the expectation that the `boon' of additional k (0) will cause others to in-
crease their extraction of it su±ciently to reduce its extinction date. This, in
turn, causes individuals to increase their own extraction rates. This `curse',
however, still yields higher welfare than does the upward sloping segment.
Comparing the levels of welfare under autarky and with capital market
access, it may be seen that the autarkic equilibrium dominates for all k (0) <
¹Ã¤. Below that point, agents with capital market access expect such a
rapid extinction that they undertake very rapid, thus expensive, extraction
themselves, banking the proceeds.
Beyond that point, there are equilibria with capital market access that
dominate the autarkic. At the point at which the equilibrium with most
rapid extinction comes to dominate the autarkic, its extinction date is still
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Figure 3: Welfare varying in k (0) when ® = ° = 1;½ = 0:05;µi = 18i;a =
0:1;r = 0:03
5 Taxation
Suppose now that the government imposes an extraction tax, ±, so that
in¯nitesimal agents di retain x±
i = (1 ¡ ±)xi after having extracted quantity
xi.
In the case of literal commons, tax revenue earned might be spent pro-
viding public goods. We, however, follow the Tornell and Velasco (1992)
interpretation, and consider institutional commons. Tax revenue, ±x, is re-
turned to the commons. Thus, taxes both reduce agents' productivity from
µi and replenish the commons.
The equations in Section 3 may largely be rewritten in terms of x±
i in-











which replaces Xi in subsequent calculations. The consumption calculations
are otherwise unchanged.







® (1 ¡ ±)
1¡® ;










The extraction rate relative to the situation without a tax therefore depends
on two factors: a direct e®ect, and an indirect e®ect through the extinction
date.
















Thus, for ¯nite T ±, the e®ect of an extraction tax is to `in°ate' k (0). Whether
this increases or decreases the extinction date depends on the equilibrium
selected.
Theorem 1 goes through when kL and kH are replaced by k±




H ´ ¹Ã¤ (1 ¡ ±)
1+°
®+°. This, in turn, alters the conditions in Lemmata 3
and 4. Otherwise, the remaining results go through unchanged.
As (1 ¡ ±)
1+°
®+° < 1 for all ± > 0, the e®ect of an extraction tax is to
reduce toward zero the boundaries of the intervals de¯ned in Theorem 1.
Some initial capital stocks that, without taxation, were in IL (resp. IM) are,
with taxation, in IM (resp. IH). Thus, taxation increases the set of k (0)
over which non-extinction is possible.

































The e®ect of taxation appears in both the consumption and extraction terms.
Figure 4 displays the welfare consequences of an extraction tax. This is
set at ± = :5 for illustrative purposes; the other parameters are as they were
in earlier ¯gures.
Without extinction, welfare is not altered by the tax in this example.
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Figure 4: Welfare consequences of ± = :5; other parameters as before
equation 26 and equation 25 owes to di®ering extinction dates. Without
extinction, this example leaves extraction rates unchanged.
The ¯nite extinction equilibrium in which welfare increases in k (0) dom-
inates that without an extraction tax. In this case, the replenishment e®ect
of the extraction tax seems to dominate its reduced productivity e®ect.
Finally, in the cursed equilibrium, taxation worsens welfare. This e®ect
is mediated by hastened extinction. More positively, the domain over which
the cursed equilibrium is possible is reduced by taxation. In the extreme, at
± = 1, the IM interval disappears, eliminating the cursed equilibrium.
A consumption tax may also be considered using similar techniques. Sup-
posing that the tax that reduces consumption to c"
i = (1 ¡ ")ci modi¯es
equation 1 for
_ k (t) = ak (t) ¡ x(t) + "c(t);k(0) > 0:
All the steps taken above may be repeated. As the equation of motion is
now more complicated, so is the new version of equation I.
Savings taxes are more di±cult to consider. These would reduce xi ¡ ci
when this di®erence was positive, but not otherwise, introducing a kink into
agents' problems. Such a tax corresponds most closely to capital controls.
236 Discussion
We have analysed extraction from a commons when agents have access to
capital markets. Comparison to the standard in the literature, in which
agents do not have such access, shows that the results can di®er signi¯cantly.
Qualitatively, the di®erence appears to be largest when the resource in the
commons grows quickly. A further comparison that may be of interest, given
the existing literature, would be to the situation with storage.
The extraction tax considered above may be thought of as decreasing
individuals' µi, increasing their extraction costs. At the outset of the taxation
discussion, it was noted that a literal understanding of the commons might
not return tax revenue raised to the commons. Under this interpretation,
governments may spend it on public goods of various sorts. Within the
framework of this model, the one parameter that might be in°uenced by
such expenditures is individuals' productivity, µi. If tax revenue increased
µi, then the welfare consequences of the tax might be the opposite of those
developed above.
Three generalisations seem fairly natural. First, the speci¯cation of the
constant a is, in general, an over-simpli¯cation. Biological models typically
allow the growth rates to be functions of the stock (q.v. Dockner and Sorger,
1996; Kremer and Morcom, 2000), a(k) in this case. Implications of this
generalisation are sketched here.
The equations underlying equation A are unchanged. Equation 2, how-
ever, becomes















Thus, equation 14 becomes







Integrability requires a new Uzawa extraction condition; the equivalent of
equation I will no longer be a clear expression of Qa¡g (T).
A second generalisation involves analysis of strategic agents, as in Tornell
and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999). Strategic analysis requires
calculating optimal strategies for every combination of private savings and
commons stock that can be reached from the problem's initial conditions.
Thus, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is a PDE in private savings
and commons stock.
A ¯nal generalisation involves considering the possibility of default by
borrowing agents.
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